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it will be before a more or less permanent political and economic structure arises in the USER? Can we foresee its nature? Can we postulate future Soviet policies with any real confidence in the face of daily societal evolutions that border on revolution? Are
we conZident of what imminent German unification will mean? Or can we predict the outcome when an economically united Europe
• J embraces a newly unified Germany?
In Asia, are we so certain of ~/~i the impacts of growing Indian and Japanese military / ~ establishments and, especially, the potential for that capability ~~" to affect intent?
~%~-k~ In the face of so many questions without answers, certainty ~/~ "'~ will only replace uncertainty ~ word games. In fact, the only ~~ real certainties at this point are the success of containment and the prospect for continuing uncertainty in the wake of that success.
The difficulty some have in accepting uncertainty as a legitimate and even dominant element in a new strategic calculus grows out of Cold War conditioning. For over forty years "threat" was virtually synonymous ~ "Warsaw Pact" or "Soviet" threat in most minds. At the same time, analysts had come to exert a powerful influence in determining the probable effectiveness of individual systems and even whole forces using a I highly quantified representation of this Soviet threat. In contrast, the future will require recognition of multiple diverse threats, and will dema much-increased analytical effort be devoted to their qualitative as well as quantitative aspects.
But if we accept ~ uncertainty and change a~ the principal elements in a new strategic calculus, then we must gauge the extent of that uncertainty and the nature of the various major changes which are underway at home and overseas.
SECTION II A NEW NATIONAL AGENDA; CHANGING PRIORITIES AT HOME
There is an'emerging domestic consensus around a new set of national priorities.
Both the list of priorities as well as their relative ranking differ substantially from the set which prevailed at Ronald Reagan's inauguration ten years ago.
This list of domestic priorities)which constitutes virtually a new national agenda)affects the formulation of strategy and supporting structure choices in several ways. First, the relative ranking which the public accords to military threats obviously has a direct effect on subsequent Congressional authorization and appropriation. Second, and less obvious, is the effect which the relative ranking of priorities has in "tilting" policy makers' international perspectives. When ~/ military component.
concerns based on military threats and foreign developments score high on the public conscious (as they did until the last year or so) then, in general, policy makers are more likely to adopt an activist and interventionist global policy with an appropriate If, on the other hand, the public signals little concern with questions of foreign military threat or overseas conflicts, then, in general, policy makers will be more likely to opt for a more conservative less intervention-prone international ~~k. )
When, as is the case now, the public ranks virtually all major ~ ~ concerns above the fear of foreign military threats, then the ~ ~t~'
conditions are ripe for the reemergence of~ ne6-isolationist ~ ~,~,~ strongly support the conclusion that the public considers threats to our economy to be both more likely and more dangerous to the nation than it does any potential military threats. In fact, eliminating the "twin deficits" and strengthening our economic health may well be the number two public concern, ranking just behind the drug issue.
As a part of this emerging focus on the economy and quality of life, there appears to be widespread agreement that our economy will be increasingly controlled by others. In the case of Japan, public perceptions border on classifying the Japanese Or is it access to future markets? Is it our status as a "pacific power?" Or is it treaties? Is it the notion of the U.S. as a sort of balancing wheel against regional hegemonies?
Is it a surviving commitment to containing still powerful Soviet Pacific forces? Or, is it something less concrete--e.g., a
historical and emotional tie colored by a conviction that Japanese policies are more easily influenced within rather than outside the de facto alliance?
There is widespread Asian mistrust of Japanese intentions, a condition which generates pressures for a continued U.S. presence as the only powerful player without regional ambitions. That same mistrust of Japanese intentions is also at least partially responsible for a widespread trendktoward acquisition of military ~ ~ ( capabilities which are more appropriate for regional power projection than for maintaining national territorial integrity.
ii In addition to the region-specific framework of trends and changes which could jeopardize future U.S. interests, there is also a handful of broader trends, particularly in the Third
World, which will have major impacts on our future policies, strategies, and selection of an interim military force structure. In the interim we will have to fashion the smaller force structure which the public has mandated so that we further our strategic objectives while minimizing risks. We might redefine those strategic objectives along the lines of these examples. force structure capabilities which we will be able to afford (active and reserve) constitutes risk. Such risk demands that the combination of implementing concepts and executing means which we select to support national policies be chosen with close attention to reducing this risk to the maximum extent practical.
Industrialization in the Third
Military risks can be reduced by a variety of means)not all of which are themselves military. In addition to the composition of the force structure and determination of force posture, such means can include alliances, treaties, arms control, military aid, development of trade dependencies and other influencing arrangements, supra-national mutual security frameworks, etc.
All of these are likely to be necessary during the interim period that will precede our gaining relative certainty of future soviet intent.
In the specific case of force structure (and force posture), we must craft a structure which is capable of supporting major If we can present a convincing case for a revised structure which meets this challenge, then we may be able to restore a broad consensus on military spending and its important contribution to national security.
